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ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court inappropriately dismissed on summary judgment the claims of 
Appellants Ali S. Yazd and Parvin Yousefi ("Homeowners") for fraudulent non-
disclosure and fraudulent concealment. Fraudulent non-disclosure requires that "(1) the 
nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the 
party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." Hermansen v. 
Tasuhs, 48 P.3d 235, 242 (Utah 2002) (emphasis added). Similarly, "[fraudulent 
concealment requires that one with a legal duty or obligation to communicate certain facts 
remain silent or otherwise act to conceal material facts known to him." McDougal v. 
Weed. 945 P.2d 175,179 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis added). 
Although Appellee Woodside Homes Corporation ("Builder") claims it did not 
have knowledge (and thus no duty to disclose) regarding the collapsible soil directly 
underneath the house it built for the Homeowners ("House"), disputed issues of fact 
nevertheless exist regarding whether the Builder fraudulently failed to disclose (or 
concealed) its knowledge of collapsible soil underlying the nearby off-site land adjoining 
the House. 
A. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE BUILDER HAD KNOWLEDGE OF 
COLLAPSIBLE SOILS UNDERLYING THE CHURCH SITE 
For purposes of summary judgment and the present appeal the Builder concedes 
1 
that "the court could assume that Woodside had the Delta Report,1 was knowledgeable 
about its contents and understood the soil conditions on the Church Site." (Brief of 
Appellee at 12.) The Builder obtained this knowledge before it built the House for the 
Homeowners.2 
Specifically, the Delta Report discloses that the Church Site - a parcel of property 
directly adjoining the Homeowners' lot 304 (see. Exhibit B attached to Brief of 
Appellants)3 - contained deep collapsible soil which, in some places, went 27 feet deep. 
(R at 717, U 11.) These collapsible soils were not miles from the Homeowners' lot, or 
even blocks away. They were in the Church Site that touched the Homeowners' lot. In 
fact, one test hole on the Church site which was approximately 30 feet from the lot that 
the Homeowners subsequently purchased from the Builder, contained approximately eight 
feet of collapsible soil. (Rat 7194 31.) 
Further, the Builder not only knew of the deep collapsible soil nearby the 
Homeowners' lot before the Homeowners purchased it in 1995, but they clearly knew of 
the nearby collapsible soil when the Homeowners complained to the Builder in 1997 of 
1
 As noted in the Homeowners' opening appeal brief, Prior to the LDS Church 
selling the LDS parcel to the Builder, the LDS Church engaged Delta Geotechnical 
Consultants, Inc. to conduct a soils test on the LDS parcel (R at 715, f 22.) The 
Homeowners refer herein to the report of that soils test as the "Delta Report." 
2
 See. Brief of Appellants at 6-9; Brief of Appellee at 12. 
3
 In Exhibit B, the Church Site is the "Panorama Point B" parcel. 
2 
cracking and settlement-related problems with the House. 
Accordingly, the Builder's admitted knowledge of the Delta Report and the deep 
collapsible soils discussed therein is undisputed for purposes of summary judgment and 
the present appeal. 
B. THE BUILDER OWED THE HOMEOWNERS A DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
ITS KNOWLEDGE OF THE DEEP COLLAPSIBLE SOILS IN THE 
CHURCH SITE WHICH DIRECTLY ADJOINS THE LOT PURCHASED 
BY THE HOMEOWNERS 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court held that "[bjecause Plaintiffs cannot 
establish that Woodside had knowledge of any such information, it necessarily follows 
that there can be no duty to disclose the information to the Plaintiffs."4 Thus, the Trial 
Court stopped at the knowledge requirement of the Homeowners' claims without 
independently determining if the Builder owed the Homeowners a duty to disclose its 
knowledge of the deep collapsible soils in the nearby Church Site. However, the 
Builder's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment concedes that it would owe the Homeowners such a duty. This conclusion is 
the result of Builder's summary judgment memoranda omitting any discussion regarding 
the duty element of the Homeowners' two fraud claims. (R at 527-537.) In fact, the 
Homeowners even noted the omission by the Builder of any discussion about the duty 
4
 See, Brief of Appellants, Exhibit D, pg. 4. 
3 
element in footnote 10 of their Memorandum in Opposition to Woodside's Motion for 
Sunimaiy Judgmeiii. (I\ HI ,'I 1 I I he builder argued noting to the contrary in its Reply 
Memorandum in Sun-ort of Woodsulc"^ MHHMI toi Mmimaiy jutkuiienl. (R a! T»S- /I'V'I » 
Thus, for purposes of the present appeal, this element of the Homeowners' fraud ch-1- .s 
has been met, 
• - >>.- ., ..- :: •. . i, . , .idi. supreme I * .,u has heiu dint "a developer has 
a du'^ iu disclose lu iii- ^nv!in>, • '.« - . - mabK ought lo 
know makes the subdivded lots unsuitable for such residential building . . .*" l.ovcland v. 
Orcni City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (citation omitv.u;. 
'*.:.' *ih: •; .--.i:- i- - .-r:\. KK isokiiwiis nave expressly held that a seller with 
knowledge of defee<. • ! uc .-
 :/ 'v. ,:. , ; . - . • - * .- --. . :>. sa^ 
defects. For example, Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420 dN.J. lyv ; ' : • ^ i * 
of new homes 'failed to disclose to homebuyers that it developed their homes near an 
abai idoned hazardous s\ aste dump ' I he Strawn court IK ... mat i He builder-developer 
is also liable for nondisclosure oi oii-siicplr. ,. *•• dr ^ i - kiu»uu w i. a:id 
unknown and not readily observable by the bir ei -1 die existence of tho-c 
conditions is of sufficient materiality to affect the habitability, use, or enjoyment of 
the property and,, therefore, render the property substantially less desirable to the 
objectively reasonable buyer. 
-- ! **'*•• ! ••- Mj.ii\wj. wOurt noted that, "1 here is no logical reason 
why a certain ciasb of sellers and b^ ol* cr^ <- ..ould not disclose off site matters that 
4 
materially affect the value of property." Id at 430. In Tobin v. Paparone Construction 
Ca, 137 N.J. Super. 518, 526 (1975), the seller of residential property was held liable for 
failing to disclose its knowledge that tennis courts would be constructed on an adjoining 
property. In Timm v. Clement, 574 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa App. 1997), the defendant-seller 
sold the plaintiff-buyers property contaminated with petroleum products and which was 
near underground storage tanks, both of which the defendant failed to disclose to the 
plaintiff. In imposing "a duty on a seller to disclose latent defects located on property 
owned by the seller, but off-site the property to be sold" the Timm court held that, "The 
facts of this case place an even more obvious duty on Clement than the seller in Strawn 
[cited above] to disclose off-site conditions. Here, the off-site conditions were on 
property owned by Clement, The property abutted the property he sold to Timms." Id at 
371-72 (emphasis added). In Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss Corp.. 182 Cal. App. 2d 325 
(1960), the seller-defendant sold a house to the plaintiff-buyer which was constructed on 
fill and was in the area of an ancient slide and an area of underground water, which the 
seller was aware of from a soil report. The Buist court held that the seller-defendant 
owed a duty to the plaintiff-seller to disclose both the on-site and off-site conditions. Id 
at 330. In O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp.. 542 A.2d 333 (Conn. App. 1988), the seller 
was held liable to the buyer for failing to disclose the existence of a water well near the 
property sold. The court noted that a jury had found in interrogatories that the seller knew 
5 
o f the existence of the well, had a duty to disclose it, and failed to do so, which the court 
c • ' tred forms the essence of a fi audulent in isrepresentai:oi; i ^ a; ; : ; r ? >. See also, 
Campbell, Colin, annotation, Luhihi\ u; \ eudor 01 Real-h statu Broker ior l-aiiuic u» 
Disclose Information Concerning Off-Site Conditions Affecting Value of properly -tl 
: • . .. - u > ) . 
. ..^- ..^^vCvu Uui\ .. :<> . .K, Knowledge oi the adjacent 
soil conditions, but the above L . -: ;: 11? - • 
the same to the Homeowners according to Utah and courts from other jurisdictions. 
C I "HE COLLAPSIBLE SOIL IN THE CHURCH SITE IS MATERIAL 
INFORMATION 
disclosed/concealed information was materidL. . ' ^ l 
continued presence of collapsible soils would be material information," (emphasis in 
original), its Mem.orand.uni Decision does not expressly state that information regarding 
collapsible soils in Ihr acijiunJIIIJJ Church Kite \\ tiiiifeiril 
A matter can be said to be material if it is one upon which n rensonubk.1 m;in w 011M 
attach importance in determining h is choice of action in the transaction. 3 Restatement of 
'
 :;
 s- =;.K* ••• - * ^i.ciicuu Jurisprudence 2d 236-240, Fraud and Deceit, §§ 
i/z-i/ 'b. ' V " r - '-** " ^u\; . ; i ; ../iviiigenceand 
prudence would think to be of some importance in determining *• i- 5': ..'" 
6 
Hermansen. 48 P.3d at 242 (citation omitted). The "question of materiality as it relates to 
the importance or significance of the omitted information is, at least on one level, a 
factual issue to be determined by the jury." State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Utah 
1993). The Strawn court also held that, "A 'material fact' is not confined to conditions 
on the premises." Strawn, 657 A.2d at 429. 
Regarding the conditions of the adjacent Church Site as contained in the Delta 
Report, the Builder's own realtor even testified that he would have liked to have the Delta 
Report when selling the lots in Homeowners' subdivision: 
Q: Would you like to have this [Delta Report] when you're selling those 
properties? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: How come? 
A: Well, I think for myself and anyone else that, like we're disclosing now, 
anything in and around the area if they had any concerns, it would be important for 
them to know." 
(R at 569.) To hold that information regarding collapsible soils directly underlaying the 
House is material to the Homeowners, but information regarding collapsible soil in the 
adjoining lot is not material to the homeowners is illogical as noted by the Strawn court 
above. Geologic hazards do not obey arbitrary property lines. Clearly geologic hazards 
follow their own will. A company as experienced in home construction as Builder cannot 
assume deep collapsible soils at the Church Site suddenly stop at the boundaries of 
adjacent lots, especially after receiving complaints from the Homeowners regarding 
7 
settlement problems, as well as other nearby property owners like the Seawrights (see. 
Brief of Appellants at 3 4 ) 
Builder claims that the field report and visual iiispaliun h\ its cfuiitkvt SOIIKIHIW 
supersedes and washes away all its knowledge of the nearby collapsible soil in the 
acijonaiig U;di. : t ML^. 1 lowever, Builder did not get the field report from its engineer 
u. * •"' -—.a ./.• / \ ;;••.: i.
 4 : .•>.;,..] ;.;: ;\-.. : . t;Ji was months after 
Homeowners had aireadv sinned a contract to nur^H-v fSr- ' • -.i-stion and have 
Builder build the House on said lot. Builder could have (and should have) thus at any 
time .iun.ig wie negotiations and closing of the sale in question informed the Homeowners 
* , • t-. K\^
 ni lM- |! „ (| o n f i i i K • 
Further, it should not be up to the Birlc!^ ( -r '•• * - « VI.M-
if a soils report is somehow no longer valid or material due to a subsequent report:,, 
especially when the two reports are on different, (but adjoining) pieces of land, and are 
n
^ e n i \ ^ • - • • ! / . • • 
In sum, material ity is inherently a factual issue i o appropriate for si 1111 mai y 
I he Delta Report discussed invasive soils testing such as boring holes tens of feet 
down lo ascertam the composition and location of underlying soil and bedrock. The field 
rcr^r by the Builder's engineer was a visual report: made by the engineer viewing the 
excavation. Clearly, even though Builder excavated down approximately five feet, h-
engineer cannot view the soil six feet down, ten feet down or twenty feet down. In ti c 
end, the Homeowners' had the soil under the House tested, which revealed ir- - - • 
of collapsible soil under parts of the House. (R at"1"' * ! ! 
8 
judgment. Further, any holding that collapsible soil underlying a lot is material but 
collapsible soil in an adjoining lot is not is illogical and unreasonable. Finally, Builder's 
subsequent visual field report cannot be used to erase the materiality of the prior invasive 
soils testing embodied in the Delta Report. Accordingly, issues of fact exist regarding the 
materiality element of the Homeowners' fraud claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, issues of fact exist regarding the Homeowners' fraud 
claims based on Builder's knowledge of the soil underlying the adjoining Church Site, 
which was material and which it had a duty to disclose to the Homeowners. The Court 
should thus overrule the Trial Court's award of summary judgment and remand this case 
for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this L/ \ day of May, 2004 ^ 
Z, L.C. 
Skpu^iQuesenberry 
J. Bryasi Quesenberry 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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